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INTRODUCTION 
The Association amended its CC&R's by a method created whole 
cloth by the trustees. Appellee would have us believe that the 
Association's trustees invented the written balloting process in 
order to allow for more participation by the property owners. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The trustees had 
attempted for years, unsuccessfully, to amend the CC&R's in 
face-to-face meetings of members of the Association. Having been 
defeated at every turn, the trustees created a method by which 
they controlled the flow of information, they created the rules 
and procedures for voting and tallying votes, and they controlled 
the outcome. The procedures they employed were contrary to the 
Association's charter documents and the provisions of the extant 
CC&R's. 
In pursuit of their goal, the trustees violated all of the 
fundamental rules of shareholder voting. There was no notice 
given to all members, there was no record of those entitled to 
vote, there was no record date set or membership list produced, 
deadlines for voting established by the trustees were ignored and 
extended without notice, and the explicit rules in the 
Associations' bylaws regarding tallying of votes were ignored. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellee indicates in paragraph 4 of its Statement of 
Facts that the "bylaws do not specifically require that all 
voting be done at a meeting." The bylaws only contemplate 
face-to-face meetings. Sections 2.5 (voting requirements, 
casting votes, proxies), 2.6 (record date establishment), 2.7 
(quorum, reconvened meetings), and 2.8 (irregularities) of the 
bylaws, only make sense in the context of a face-to-face meeting. 
Likewise, requirements of record dates, membership lists 
available at the time of voting, and determination of those 
entitled to vote, all require a face-to-face meeting and a 
definitive voting date. 
2. Without the requirement of a meeting, fundamental 
rights of members can be ignored, which is precisely what was 
done in the present case. No record date was set. R. 749-752. 
No membership list was prepared or maintained at any time. R. 
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750-753. Voting deadlines were set and ignored. Voting was 
extended arbitrarily for more than one year because the trustees 
were unable to muster sufficient votes to amend the CC&R's. R. 
51,53,54,356. In tallying votes, specific voting procedures were 
ignored. R. 33,512. 
3. Contrary to the implication from Appellee's Statement 
of Facts, paragraph 4, while the Bylaws allow for reconvened 
meetings of shareholders, no meeting of shareholders of the 
Association prior to the filing of the present action was ever 
reconvened. 
4. In reply to Appellee's Statement of Facts, paragraph 5, 
the trustees were never properly elected by vote of the 
shareholders of the Association, since no reconvened meeting was 
ever held, and yet the trustees acted and transacted business 
without authority. 
5. Contrary to Appellee's assertions in its Statement of 
Facts, paragraphs 7 through 11, the Association's attorney 
recommended the written ballot mechanism not as an attempt to 
allow more participation by property owners, but in order to 
comply with the Association's CC&R's which clearly required that 
a majority of the members approve amendments. R. 245. 
6. Appellee's Statement of Facts, paragraph 13, indicates 
that the notice to members "requested" that ballots be returned 
no later than November 30, 1994. In fact, both the notice to 
members and the letter from counsel for the Association clearly 
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indicated that the deadline for voting was November 30, 1994. 
The notice stated the ballot was "(to be returned by November 30, 
1994)." R. 53. Mr. Welling's letter was even more explicit: 
"Please note: the voting period expires November 30, 1994; 
ballots must be returned by that date." (emphasis in original). 
7. The trustees have expressed through their actions, time 
and time again, that they do not want the input of the property 
owners. Attempts to amend the CC&R's failed year after year, yet 
the trustees ignored the wishes of the property owners who 
participated and continued to scheme to amend them. 
8. No one discussed the use of a reconvened meeting in 
connection with amending the CC&R's in 1994 since the 
Association's counsel had already informed the Board that use of 
a reconvened meeting was not an option. 
9. Contrary to Appellee's Statement of Facts, paragraphs 
14 and 15, and no matter how often Appellee asserts that the 
notice of the balloting to amend the CC&R's was hand delivered to 
each of the members of Highland Estates, the record is clear that 
the notice was not hand delivered and that all homeowners did not 
receive the notice and the ballot1. R. 473. No less that the 
past-President of the Association, Michael Ferrigno, testified 
that he "did not vote in 1994 when the Highland Estates 
1
 Note how carefully Appellee couches its statements in paragraphs 
14 and 15 -- "the Amended CC&R's was to be hand delivered," and 
"Plaintiffs received by hand delivery." It, too, recognizes that 
not all members were hand delivered (or even delivered at all) 
the notice, ballot and amended CC&R's. 
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Properties Owners Association proposed to amend the CC&R's for 
the subdivision because I did not receive any notice of the 
vote/7 and "I did not receive any letters soliciting my vote, did 
not receive copies of the proposed amendments to the CC&R's, nor 
was I given a ballot with which to cast my vote/' R. 473. 
10. Paragraph 17 of Appellee's Statement of Facts notes 
that the January, 1995 Association newsletter extended the voting 
period for the measure. Appellee fails to note that the 
newsletter was sent months after the deadline for voting had 
already passed, the extension period for voting was never put to 
the vote of the members nor approved by the members, and there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the newsletter was properly 
delivered to all members. 
11. Paragraph 18 of Appellee's Statement of Facts is simply 
wrong and ignores the explicit wording of the notice and cover 
letter, the only documents the trustees supposedly went to great 
pains to deliver to all members. The deadline of November 30, 
1994, was highlighted, and the exact words chosen and used by the 
Association's counsel were: "the voting period expires November 
30, 1994." 
12. Paragraph 20 of Appellee's Statement of Facts fails to 
note that the amended CC&R's as recorded varied substantially 
from the CC&R's submitted to the members for their approval. A 
provision dealing with liability of members for bridal path 
improvements, a key provision according the trustees in their 
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description of the amended CC&R's, was completely omitted from 
the CC&R's as recorded. Thirteen lots were excluded from the 
definition of residential lots in the recorded CC&R's versus the 
CC&R's submitted for approval. R. 756-767, 768-779. 
13. The trial court, in ruling on Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, held that Appellants were proper parties to 
bring a derivative action on behalf of the Association, that they 
properly represented other members of the Association similarly 
situated, and that the action was properly brought as a 
derivative action, in the right of all the other shareholders of 
the Association. R. 654,655. 
14. Contrary to the assertions of paragraph 33 of 
Appellee's Statement of Facts, plaintiff Rebecca LeVanger did not 
"wrongfully" secure the voting ballots and did not "circumvent" 
discovery procedures. She was given access to the ballots by the 
President of the Association upon request. There was nothing 
surreptitious about it2. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Properly View the Evidence. 
The trial court failed to consider the cumulative effect 
that all of the procedural irregularities had on the voting 
process undertaken by the Association's trustees rendering the 
vote fatally defective. 
2
 The trustees voted to impeach Mr. Ferrigno as President and 
later asked Ms. LeVanger to request his resignation while he lay 
dying of cancer, in retaliation. They are now attempting to 
unseat Ms. LeVanger in retaliation for the lawsuit. 
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The Association failed to establish the propriety of the 
notice given to members. On its face, the Affidavit of Mr. 
Welling does not contain information regarding hand delivery of 
the notices. Yet the trial court accepted the unsupported 
representation of counsel for the Association. 
The deadline for voting was explicitly set forth and later 
extended (long after the deadline had passed) until sufficient 
votes could be obtained to achieve the result the trustees 
desired. Even in circumstances in which mail-in balloting is 
allowed, there is must be a reasonable length of time to conduct 
the election. More than one year passed, 41 lots changed hands 
in the interim, the whole purpose of the balloting had to be lost 
on most voters by the end of the unreasonably lengthy balloting 
process. 
Establishing a record date is fundamental to any voting 
process, defining eligibility to vote and identifying those 
entitled to vote. A record date was not established. 
Votes were tallied behind closed doors, not at a 
face-to-face meeting. The voting irregularities were numerous 
and render the result voidable by the trial court. 
Appellee argues that the actions of the trustees are 
protected by the business judgment rule. One of the very cases 
cited by Appellee, In re Croton River Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41 (2d. 
Cir. 1995), questioned the applicability of the business judgment 
rule in the homeowner association context, citing the primary 
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case relied on by Appellee, Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue 
Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990). The court noted: 
Levandusky emphasized that the business judgment rule 
was to be looked to for purposes of analogy only and 
that the rule would have to be adapted in light of the 
somewhat different context of boards of not-for-profit 
cooperative condominiums. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 
1321-22. It is the case with regard to such boards 
that members will be condominium owners and will rarely 
be wholly disinterested. 
The trustees acted in their own self-interest and in bad 
faith in forcing the amended CC&R's on the Association's members 
and their actions should not be shielded by the business judgment 
rule. 
II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion 
The evidence sought to be introduced in connection with the 
motion to reconsider were the ballot results, proving the 
invalidity of the vote tally made, and the Affidavits of two home 
owners who came forward late in the process to offer their 
testimony on important matters of notice of the balloting process 
and sufficiency of the disclosure in the notice. 
Counsel for plaintiffs did not waive plaintiffs rights to 
contest the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider. Counsel agreed to go forward with oral argument, 
noting for the record that the pleadings had not been reviewed. 
The trial court indicated that it would consider whether it was 
necessary to review the pleadings. Following oral argument the 
trial court noted that its decision was based solely on 
procedural grounds and that it, therefore, had no need to review 
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the pleadings. Counsel for plaintiffs did not stipulate that the 
trial court's decision not to review the pleadings was correct or 
that plaintiffs would not appeal the trial court's decision on 
the matter. 
As for the notion that counsel "agreed to submit/' 
Appellee's argument is incredible. When the trial court, 
following argument, says "are you ready to submit" or "will you 
submit," it doesn't mean "if you say yes you are agreeing with 
everything I am doing here today!" It means, "are you done 
arguing." And plaintiffs' counsel was. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), still provides the standard that should be applied in 
considering whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious: 
when (1) the matter is presented in a "different light" 
or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has been 
a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new 
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the 
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court 
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was 
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the 
court. 
Id. at 1311 (citations omitted). 
The trial court abused its discretion and its ruling should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred and its decisions should be 
overturned. 
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DATED: November 19, 1999. 
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C. 
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